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HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
IN the case of Lutterellv. Beynell, 1 Mod. 282-283, it is stated,
that "several witnesses were received and allowed to prove, that
William Maynard did, at several times, discourse and declare the
same things, and to the like purpose, that he testified now. And
my Lord Chief Baron said, "though a hearsay is not to be allowed
as a direct evidence, yet it might be made use of, to this purpose, viz.: to prove that William Maynard was constant to himself, whereby his testimony was corroborated."
In Bac. Abr. tit. -Evidence (K), the above case, and also Skin.
402, pl. 37, and 2 Hawk. P. C.431, are quoted, and the doctrine
is thus stated: "It seems agreed, that what another has been
heard to say, is no evidence, because the party was not on oath;
also, because the party who is affected thereby, had not an opportunity of cross-examining; but such speeches or discourses may
be made use of, by way of inducement or illustration of what is
properly evidence. Also, what a witness hath been heard to say
at another time, may be given in evidence, in order either to
invalidate or confirm the testimony he gives in court," &c.
The doctrine of the case in 1 Mod. is given in the text of
Buller's N. P. 294 (ed. of 1791), but it is added: "But,
clearly, it is not evidence in chief, and it seems doubtful, whethel
it is so, in reply or not"-.and for this, the case of Holliday v.
VOL. XXI.-1
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Sweeting, Mich. Term 16 Geo. 3, is cited.

See also Lofft's Gilt

279. This rule *of evidence was followed on the trials for higl
treason in Ireland in the years 1795 to 1798: 1 MacNally Ev.
(ed. of 1804), pp. 378, et seq.
In the case of Rex v. Parker, decided at Trinity Term 23
Geo. 3, in the year 1783, 3 Doug. 242 (26 E. C. L. R. 95
top), but not published in America until the year 1831, BuLLER, Justice, said, in the face of the above and other authorities,
that "it was now settled, that what a witness said, not upon oath,
would not be admitted to confirm what he said upon oath; and
that the case of Lutterell v. Beynell, and the passage cited from
Hawkins, was not now law."
This decision settled the law ir
England, and so it remains, to this time.
In 1 Phillips on Ev. 307, it is said: "It may be observed,
on this kind of evidence in general, that a representation without
oath, can scarcely be considered as any confirmation of a statement
upon oath. It is the oath that confirms; and the bare assertion
that requires copfirmation. The probability is, that almost in
every case, the witness who swears to certain facts, at the trial,
has been heard to assert the same facts before the trial; and it is
not so much in support of his character,that he has given the same
account, as it would be to his discredit, that he should ever have
made one different," &c. Mr. Phillips then goes on to say: "In
one point of view, a former statement by the witness appears to
be admissible, in confirmation of his evidence; and that is, where
the counsel on the other side impute a design to misrepresent, from
some motivo of interest or relationship; there, indeed, in order to
repel such an imputation, it might be proper to show, that the
Avitness made a similar statement at a time when the supposed
motive did not exist, or when motives of interest would have
prompted him to make a different statement of the facts." See
also 2 Poth. Ob. 251-2, Evans's Ed. 1826.
Mr. Starkie, in his 1st vol. p. 148, says: 1 It seems to be the
better opinion that a witness cannot be confirmed by proof that
he has given the same account before, even although it has been
proved that he has given a different account, in order to impeach
his veracity; for his mere declarationof the fact is not evidence."
His having given a contrary account, although not upon oath,
necessarily impeaches either his veracity or memory; but his
having asserted the same thing, does not in general, earry hz
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credibility further than, nor so far, as his oath. He then proceeds to say: "But although such evidence be not generally admissible in confirmation of a'witness, there may be many cases,
where, under special circumstances, it possibly might be admissible; as for instance, in contradiction of evidence, tending to show,
that the account was a fabricationof late date, and where consequently it becomes material to show that the same account had
been given before its ultimate effect and operation, arising from a
change of circumstances, could have been foreseen."
Mr. Greenleaf, vol. 1, sec. 469, says: "But evidence, that he
has, on other occasions, made statements similar to what he has
testified in the cause, is not admissible; unless, where a design to
misrepresent is charged upon the witness, in consequence of his
relation to the party, or to the cause; in which case, it seems, it
may be proper to show, that he made a similar statement, before
that relation existed." See also 2 Russ. on Crimes 982, for exceptions to the general rule, that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Mr. Russell, however, does not notice the above as an
exception. 2 Russ. on Crimes 682-690, ed. of 1836.
In the United States, there has been diversity of decision,
arising from some of the courts having followed the decision in
1 Mod. Thus, Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 22 Pick. 397; Hfenalerson v. Jones, 10 S. & R. 822; Coffin v. Anderson, 4
Blackf. 398. But, in Bobb and Others v. .fackley . Welton, 23
Wend. 50, BRoNsoN, J., in a very able opinion, repudiates the
doctrine of the earlier English cases, which, he declares, are no
longer respected in Westminster Hall, and says: "I have failed
to discover in them, anything calculated to shake my decided conviction, -that this kind of confirmatory evidence is of dangerous
tendency, and ought not to be received, except under such special
circumstances as already have been noticed. We have not, in
this state, departed from the ancient and safe landmark in the
law of evidence, which requires a witness in all cases to speak
under the solemn sanction of an oath, and I am unwilling to peril
the lives, the fame, or the property of individuals, by adopting
the contrary doctrine." To the same point, consult 24 Wend.
465; 17 Barb. 489; 1 Parker C. R. 147; 12 Yermt. 346; 18
Id.208; 5 Rawle 91; 10 Peters 412; 11 How. 480.
The admissibility of such testimony (see Cowen & Hill's notes
to Phillips on Evidence, vol. 3, top page 777, ed. of 1848) "is
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well established in several courts, in all the plenitude of the old
authorities," citing, amongst other decisions, that of Cooke v.
Curtis, 6 Har. & J. 93, decided in June 1823. That case was
followed by Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. -Davison& Symington, 30
Md. 105, decided in January 1869, but no reason was assigned,
except that the ruling of the court below was affirmed, as falling
within the decision in Cooke v. Curtis. McAleer v. fforsly, 85
Md. 439, decided in March 1872, completes the series of decisions
in Maryland based upon the case in 1 Modern. In this latter
"Maryland case, it appears that the very foundation of Cooke v.
Curtis was attacked, and the authorities upon which it was decided
shown to have been exploded long ago in: England, and generally
in the United States. Notwithstanding this, the court, at page
464, says: "No matter what may be the law decided by courts
of other states, or elsewhere, Cooke v. Curtis is a binding authority on it," not because well founded on the general principles of
evidence, but because "said case had remained unquestioned by
the courts of this state (what courts had the right to question it ?)
for nearly fifty years, and whilst it would not be expedient or safe
to extend or enlarge its application, yet it has been the uninterrupted practice of all courts, to receive their own decisions as of
binding force," &c. "SStat pro ratione, voluntas."
The court, in 35 Md., apparently not being satisfied with the
reason it had given in the case of Cooke v. Curtis proceeds to say :
"But an examination of the authorities will show that Cooke v.
Curtis is not such a wide departure from principle or adjudged
cases as has been asserted in argument, and that the admissibility
of such evidence is cogently advocated in Henderson v. Jones, 10
S. & R. 332, and Coffin v. Anderson, 4 Blackf. 395," still
referring to cases based upon the exploded doctrine announced in
1 Modern. In regard to these two cases, quoted in 35 Md.
with some approval, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Conrad v. Griffey, 11 How. 491, said: "While the rule was
otherwise in England (viz. in conformity to the decision in 1
Modern), some of the state decisions, already cited, were expressly
grounded on the rule (see Henderson v. Jones, 10 S. & R. 332).
and others on cases adopting that rule, 4 Blackf. 398. But,
since the rule became changed in England, or from being doubtful, became well established against the introduction of such testimony, the practice in some states, as in New York and Vermont,
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has been settled so as to correspond; and in this court also, it
has taken the same direction." And the case of Henderson v.
S.ones has since been overruled by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Craig v. Craig, 5 Rawle 91.
In 10 Peters 412, STORY, J., delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "1It is true that in Lutterell v. 1eynell, 1 Mod. Rep. 282,
it was held, that though hearsay be not allowed, as direct evidence, yet, it may be admitted, in corroboration of a witness's
testimony, to show that he affirmed the same things upon other
occasions and that he is still constant to himself. Lord Chief
Baron GILBERT has asserted the same opinion in his treatise on
Evidence, p. 185. But Mr. Justice BULLER, in his Nisi Prius
treatise, p. 294, says: "But clearly it is not evidence in chief;
and it seems doubtful, whether it is so in reply or not." The same
question came before the House of Lords in the Berkeley Peerage
Case, 4 Camp. 401, and it was there said by Lord REDESDALE,
that he had always understood, that, for the purpose of impugning the testimony of a witness, his declarations at another time
might be inquired into; but not for the purpose of confirming hi,
evidence. Lord ELDON expressed his decided opinion, that this
was the true rule to be observed by the counsel in the cause.
Lord Chief Justice EYRE is also represented to have rejected such
evidence, when offered on behalf of the defendant on a prosecution for forgery. We think, this is not only the better, but the
true opinion; and well founded on the general principles of evidence." In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as expressed in the two above cases, Cooke v. Curtiswould
be a "wide departure from principle and reported cases." In 35
Md., STEWART, J., dissented from the other four judges, upon the
point of evidence, and in a brief 6pinion, clearly and cogently
enforced what the Supreme Court of the United States declared
to be the true opinion.
The doctrine thus announced in Maryland, being exceptional
and sustained neither upon the general principles of evidence, nor
by authority, we should have thought that the bettbi conclusion
would have been to overrule the previous decisions. The maxim
stare deeisis, though of the greatest weight when applied to rules
of property, is not entitled to the same consideration in matters
which relate merely to the remedy where a change will not .lis.
turb vested rights.

